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ABSTRACT 
Prototypical knowledge plays an important role in many representation formal- 
isms, particularly in those used to implement diagnostic expert systems. The aim of 
this paper is to present ageneral technique for performing approximate r asoning in 
systems based on prototypicai knowledge representation. We extend some of the 
formalisms currently used in knowledge representation to the case of uncertain 
knowledge by defining a more flexible mechanism for representing admissible values 
of a given feature (via fuzzy logic), by designing eneral evaluation mechanisms for 
the match between prototypical knowledge and incomplete and/or partial data, and 
by introducing the notion of relevance in order to avoid the choice between strictly 
necessary conditions and strictly sufficient conditions. 
KEYWORDS: expert systems, prototypieal knowledge, approximate rea- 
soning, fuzzy  logic, relevance measures 
INTRODUCTION 
Starting from the mid-1970's, knowledge representation has become one of 
the major issues in the artificial intelligence community. Particular attention has 
been concentrated on frames (Fikes and Kehler [1], Minsky [2]) and semantic 
nets (Brachman [3], Woods [41). 
In the formalism of frame, the notion ofprototypicality is very central, since 
the frame is intended to represent the knowledge about a prototypical object or 
situation 1. This implies that the frame is not (or not only) the structural 
description of a class of objects that share a set of common characteristics (even 
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if it can be used for this task) but the description of a typical case. Therefore, it is 
possible that all the actual objects differ from the prototypical one in one or more 
features. In fact, the notion of default value and the possibility of overriding 
default values are very important o allow the frame system to deal with 
discrepancies that many occur in comparison with the prototypical case. 
The problem of instances that do not respect he constrains defined for the 
class has been lengthily debated among researchers working with semantic nets 
of various sorts. The usual solution is to allow the cancellation of some 
properties; this means that the value of some features in an instance may be not 
the inherited one or not in the range defined for that class of objects (or entities), 
but it may depend on the particular case under examination. 
Although this mechanism allows a semantic net to handle exceptions, it
suffers from some drawbacks. The first concerns the difficulties arising in 
defining automatic procedures of classification (Brachman and Levesque [6]) 
from both a conceptual nd a computational point of view (Brachman [7]). The 
second drawback is, in our opinion, even worse: in fact, the cancellation 
mechanism can be applied not just to one specific feature but to any feature 
characterizing a given class of objects. This implies that in any instance, that is, 
the description of a specific individual (object or entity), most of (or all) the 
features that should characterize the object or the entity may assume a value 
different from the one prescribed by the class definition. 
Let us suppose that we want to characterize the concept of dog; in such a case 
we may assume that the prototypical description of dog involves features uch as 
number of legs, and color, and that for each of them a specific set of admissible 
values is defined. Obviously, we want to tolerate that a specific dog (named 
Fido) has just three legs because of a car accident; this is possible if we admit 
that the property number of legs does not inherit he value from the prototypical 
description of dog. However, we may have a lot of trouble in accepting as an 
instance of the concept dog an individual that we know is green, with just one 
leg, no ears, and no tail. What it lacks in the formalism of semantic nets that 
admit cancellation of properties i a mechanism able to evaluate the degree of 
match between an instance and the prototype. 
This is one of the basic motivations of the work presented in this paper. We 
try to provide a formalism for evaluating a fuzzy match in a formalism capable 
of dealing with distortions and exceptions. 
Another point that deserves attention is the distinction between primitive and 
defined concepts present in many conceptual languages (Brachman and 
Sehmolze [8], Sowa [9]). A concept is considered defined if there exists a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing the concept itself. Obviously 
such a definition is made of constraints on other defined or primitive concepts. A
concept is considered primitive if only a set of necessary conditions exists. In 
this case the description is essentially a prototypical one, since the necessary 
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conditions pecify a set of features that all the instances of that entity (or object) 
should have. 
A last comment concerns the opportunity of introducing prototypical 
descriptions even for defined concepts. Let us consider the case of woman: in a 
formalism like KL-ONE (Brachman and Schmolze [8]) this concept can be 
defined as the intersection of the primitive concept human and the primitive 
concept female-animal. Nevertheless, this definition can be of little help if an 
artificial system has to recognize and reason about a woman. If we supplement 
the system with a prototypical description of woman, the system can know that 
usually a woman wears a skirt and carries a handbag. 
The addition of a prototypical description provides the system with pieces of 
knowledge that are very useful in commonsense reasoning and that in most cases 
are much more easily verified with respect to the set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. In fact, in many cases, the prototypical description consists of a set 
of features that are easy to observe because they refer to surface characteristics 
of the entity to be modeled. It is worth noting that the formalism of conceptual 
structures (Sowa [9]) allows one to define a concept via a canonical graph as well 
as to characterize it via a prototypical description. 
The kind of knowledge represented in a prototypical description is essentially 
pragmatic, and therefore itplays an important role in developing systems able to 
reason in a real domain (Zadeh [10]). Especially in the field of diagnostic expert 
systems it is necessary to perform an abductive form of reasoning: by observing 
a given set of features (findings) we have to infer what entity exhibits uch kinds 
of features (findings). In such an application the features capable of discriminat- 
ing between different hypotheses play a very important role; however, such 
features are not sufficient, and a description of the necessary features of the 
diagnostic hypotheses has to be provided in order to make sure that the 
concluding diagnosis is the desired one (in other words, in order to deal with 
uncertainties in the discernment frame). 
The relevance of prototypical descriptions (implemented via frame structures) 
in diagnostic expert systems (and more generally in problems of heuristic 
classification) has been recently recognized (Clancey [11]), although as early as 
1970s some experimental systems like PIP (Panker et al. [12]) and CENTAUR 
(Aikins [13]) showed that the capability of representing different kinds of 
knowledge (prototypical, structure, control) in a frame system offers several 
advantages. Unfortunately, mechanisms for evaluating the degree of match 
between the prototypical description contained in the frame and actual data have 
been proposed in only a few cases, and most of them adopt quite ad hoc 
methods. 
In fact, if we take into consideration the capabilities offered by current 
generation expert system shells we note that they offer little (or no) provision for 
any form of approximate r asoning. This is particularly true when we examine 
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the tools able to represent structured objects: in KEE (Fikes and Kehler [1]) 
there is a sophisticated mechanism for controlling the inheritance of properties 
but no built-in facility for approximate reasoning; in KES [14] there is the 
possibility of defining some "linguistic probabilities" (as originally proposed by 
Reggia [15]), but they are treated in a quite ad hoc manner in the reasoning 
process, and in many cases the results are surprising to the user. 
The aim of this paper is to extend some of the formalisms currently used in 
knowledge representation to the case of uncertain knowledge (Lesmo et al. [ 16], 
Prade [17]) by introducing a more flexible mechanism to evaluate the degree of 
match between the prototypical description and actual data 2. In particular we aim 
to propose a general evaluation technique for diagnostic frame-based expert 
systems (in which diagnostic hypotheses are represented by means of prototypi- 
cal structures), based on the combination of fuzzy logic (Zadeh [19]) and the 
concept of relevance of data (Torasso and Console [20]). Many approaches to 
approximate reasoning have been proposed in past years in the "production 
rules" framework (see Dubois and Prade [21], Martin-Clouaire [22], and 
Mizumoto [23] for a discussion). Our aim is to extend such approaches (in 
particular the one presented by Lesmo et al. [16]) to the case of prototypical 
structures. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the following section we will present a
scheme we have designed to represent prototypical knowledge in diagnostic 
expert systems. Next we will introduce the concept of "relevance," which 
allows us to give more flexible prototypical descriptions. In the fourth section 
we will present he mechanism we have designed for the fuzzy match of 
prototypical descriptions and specific situations, and in the fifth section we will 
discuss the functions we have designed to combine evidence values gathered 
from the match of the different chunks of knowledge constituting a prototypical 
description. 
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 
In many diagnostic expert systems, knowledge is represented by means of 
prototypical descriptions implemented through the use of framelike structures. 
Frames usually describe diagnostic hypotheses (at different levels of detail). 
2 Notice that his work is partly on the line of the research described by L~smo and Torasso [18]. 
However, here we deal essentially with problems arising when one uses prototypicai knowledge in 
expert systems, whereas the earlier paper pays more attention toproblems arising in natural language 
understanding. 
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Each flame is formed by a group of slots, most of which describe a characteristic 
(feature) of the hypothesis itself 3. 
In most systems the organization is very simple: the diagnostic hypothesis i  
decomposed into a group of features, each one of which is described in a slot of a 
frame. This means that implicitly all the descriptions contained in the slots are 
ANDed and that they are all at the same level, i.e., all of them have to be 
"necessarily" matched against data in order to instantiate the frame (some 
systems use evaluation functions, in order to allow a partial match). Such a rigid 
interpretation of  the meaning of prototypical description is inadequate in many 
application domains. 
A first way to make a prototypical description more flexible is to allow slots to 
describe more than the necessary features of the hypothesis. Our experience in 
developing diagnostic expert systems (Molino et al. [26], Torasso and Console 
[27]) suggested the subdivision of a prototypical description into two parts: 
NECESSARY conditions and SUFFICIENT conditions. The meaning of this 
distinction is obvious: necessary conditions should be satisfied in order to 
confirm a diagnostic hypothesis, whereas a hypothesis can be established if one 
of the sufficient conditions is matched. It follows that in such a scheme 
NECESSARY conditions are ANDed, SUFFICIENT conditions are ORed, and 
the two groups, each taken as a whole, are ORed in the global description of a 
hypothesis. Although this organization is very powerful from a theoretical point 
of view, it is not very useful in many practical domains, since SUFFICIENT 
conditions are very difficult to define. 
In many practical cases a slightly different organization can be very useful: 
instead of defining SUFFICIENT conditions, one can define SUPPLEMEN- 
TARY conditions. SUPPLEMENTARY conditions allow us to complete 
NECESSARY ones by describing more specific features that are not strictly 
necessary. The semantics of prototypieal descriptions i now more complicated. 
SUPPLEMENTARY slots are implicitly ORed, since we can consider that the 
instantiation of even one of them can contribute to a better characterization f a 
hypothesis (however, the relationship between NECESSARY and SUPPLE- 
3 It is worth noting that in a frame system used for diagnostic reasoning, knowledge different from 
the prototype should be represented; in particular, control knowledge and "interhypotheses 
discrimination k owledge" play an important role. Our experience (Console and Torasso [24], 
Cravetto et al. [25], Molino et al. [26], Torasso and Console [27]) suggested that wo forms of 
control knowledge are necessary: TRIGGERS and interhypotheses links. The former are activation 
rules used to decide whether a frame has to be activated ina particular case (so that he activation of
TRIGGERS is necessary toinstentiate a frame); the latter are links connecting a hypothesis toits 
ASSOCIATED and ALTERNATIVE hypotheses. A further form of knowledge we use in the 
diagnostic process is "interhypotheses di crimination knowledge," which is constituted by 
VALIDATION rules. Such rules are used to confirm or disregard the current hypothesis on the basis 
of other findings and of relations with other hypotheses (for more details, see [25, 26]). 
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MENTARY descriptions i not as clear as the one between NECESSARY and 
SUFFICIENT descriptions). 
As a simple example of a prototypical description, taken from a very simple 
mechanical domain (diagnosis of problems with a car) in which NECESSARY 
and SUPPLEMENTARY conditions have been identified, is presented in the 
following: 
FRAME: electrical problems 
NECESSARY conditions 
ignition: (impossible, faulty,) 
lights: (low_intensity, not_burning / 
SUPPLEMENTARY conditions 
battery_water_level: /low, medium) 
spark_plugs_change: 
(between_20000_and_30000_km, 
more_than_30000_km / 
In such a frame the diagnostic hypothesis "electrical problems" of a mechanical 
system has been represented. The meaning of this prototypical description can 
be paraphrased as "to have an electrical problem a car must have both an 
impossible or faulty ignition and not-functioning lights; moreover, further 
evidence in favor of the disorder can be gathered if the water level in the battery 
is low and the spark plugs are old." 
A major problem is to define how NECESSARY and SUPPLEMENTARY 
descriptions are to be combined in the global one and how their evidences 
contribute to the global evidence of the diagnostic hypothesis represented by 
means of a prototypical description. It is obvious that SUPPLEMENTARY 
conditions cannot be used as SUFFICIENT ones; they cannot confirm a 
hypothesis by themselves. This means that since SUPPLEMENTARY condi- 
tions contribute only to giving a more precise specification of the hypothesis, 
they can increase the evidence degree of the hypothesis provided only by 
matching NECESSARY conditions with actual data. Moreover, the way in 
which they contribute to the confirmation must be dependent on the degree of 
satisfaction ofNECESSARY conditions: in a certain sense SUPPLEMENTARY 
conditions cannot influence the global evaluation too much if the match of 
NECESSARY conditions and actual data is poor. 
An in-depth discussion of the mechanisms (functions) we have designed to 
combine the evidence degrees obtained in the match of NECESSARY, 
SUFFICIENT, AND SUPPLEMENTARY descriptions against a specific 
situation will be given in the section on evidence combination. Before discussing 
such a topic, we want to analyze how it is possible to give a flexible prototypical 
description and to perform a flexible match between each atomic condition 
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forming a NECESSARY (SPECIFIC or SUPPLEMENTARY) description and 
data describing a specific situation. 
INTRODUCING RELEVANCE MEASURES 
The concept of importance of data was introduced in the expert system 
CENTAUR (Aikins [13]), in which importance measures can be associated with 
the component slots of a frame (remember that in CENTAUR, which operates in 
the medical domain of pulmonary diseases, frames represent diseases and 
component slots are in turn framelike structures used to represent characterizing 
features of the diseases, e.g., pulmonary function tests). In CENTAUR, 
importance measures associated with components are used in the evaluation of 
the evidence of a frame and to guide the search strategy, suggesting which 
components o analyze first when no other control information is available. 
Information provided by importance measures eems to be context-dependent 
(components referring to the same pulmonat:y test could have different 
importance in different frames), which we believe is the correct interpretation 
for this type of information (as will be discussed later); on the other hand, Aikins 
also interprets importance measures as measures of the reliability of the 
measurements (e.g., pulmonary test) corresponding tothe component, which is 
clearly a different ype of context-independent information. Moreover, the use 
of importance measures in CENTAUR is very limited, and no formal approach 
has been proposed. 
We have introduced relevance toweigh the importance of data (or conditions 
on data), and we use them in a different and more systematic way than in 
CENTAUR. 
Consider a complex condition, and suppose that a conjunction of atomic 
conditions (imposing constraints on the values of a finding) has to be matched. 
Information about hese findings may be uncertain or incomplete, so that fuzzy 
evaluation has to be used. Often data to be tested have a different relevance in the 
evaluation of the condition; certain data may be necessary, others less important. 
It would be nice if a general evaluation function could account for this 
information. 
We propose to associate with each atom in a complex condition a relevance 
measure RM in the interval [0, 1]: A value close to 1 indicates that the atomic 
condition has great importance, and a value close to 0 indicates low importance. 
Obviously this relevance measure is context-dependent, i.e., the same atomic 
condition can have different relevance in different contexts. 
Apart from relevance, an evidence degree should be associated with the 
instantiation of each atomic condition to allow the evaluation of the global 
evidence degree of a complex condition. 
We distinguish between two evidence values for each instantiated atomic 
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condition on a finding: observed evidence and corrected evidence. We will 
denote by observed evidence the evidence of the instantiation of a datum 
(finding) provided by the user (or derived by the system from the evidence of 
other findings). Corrected evidence degrees are context-dependent values; they 
are obtained by combining the observed evidence and the relevance of an atomic 
condition in each particular context. These corrected values are those that are 
used in the evaluation of complex conditions; they are computed in such a way 
that evaluations will rely more on relevant data. 
The way in which observed evidence and relevance measures are combined to 
give corrected evidence depends on the logical connective used to form the 
complex condition starting from the atomic onditions (for the sake of simplicity 
we assume here to have conditions formed using only one type of connective, 
AND or OR, without any loss in generality). The combination can be expressed 
by introducing two functions lAND and fOR with the following type: 
lAND : DEV × D~--* DEv 
fOR : Dv.v XDRM'-*DEv 
where D~v represents he domain of evidence and DRM the domain of relevance. 
Both DEe and Dma are the closed interval [0, 1]. 
Given a complex condition, the functionsfAND and foR allow us to evaluate the 
corrected evidence of each atomic condition (from its observed evidence and its 
relevance in the context of the complex condition), respectively, if the complex 
condition is a conjunction or a disjunction. More specifically, if the complex 
condition is a conjunction, the corrected evidence of each atomic condition is 
computed by applying the lAND function to be observed evidence and the 
relevance measure of the atomic condition itself; conversely, if the complex 
condition is a disjunction, the for  function is used. 
Let us discuss how the corrected evidence has to be computed, i.e., which are 
the general requirements hat the functions fAND and fOR have to satisfy. 
Consider the case of the AND connective (dual considerations hold for the OR 
connective) and imagine a formula in which many atomic conditions are 
conjoined (suppose different relevance measures are associated with each one of 
them). Corrected evidence has to be computed in such a way that these two rules 
hold: 
• If an atom is important, the evidence of the complex condition has to 
depend irectly on its evidence. 
• If an atom is not important, its observation has to contribute to evidence in 
favor of the complex condition only to a limited extent, whereas the lack of 
its observation does not have to be determinative in the evaluation. 
This means that the lack of observation of data with low relevance has to be 
neutralized; the global evaluation must depend on the other atomic conditions 
forming the complex condition. This neutralization must be inversely propor- 
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tional to the relevance value: If  the relevance is 0, the neutralization must be 
total. For this reason, observed items of evidence have to be increased by f~i~, 
whose limit has to be the constant function Xe. 1 for m ~ 0. Note that if all 
relevance measures are equal to 1, the usual evaluation of AND conditions 
(without relevance measures) must be obtained. 
Dual considerations hold in the case of foR. In this case evidence values have 
to be decreased, and the limit for m --+ 0 is the constant function Xe.0. When the 
observed evidence of a condition is 1, its contribution to the global evaluation 
should be attenuated by taking into consideration its relevance m. 
The general requirements for the function fco~n, mcrwE are reported in (1) and 
(2) for the two cases of AND or OR connectives, respectively. 
fAsv(e,  0)= 1 fANo(e, l )=e  
fASD(0,m) = 1 - -m fANt)(1, m)= 1 
f^~a~(e, m)>--e i f0<e<l  and 0<m<l  (1) 
foR(e, 0) = 0 foR(e, 1) = e 
fOR(0,m) = 0 foR(l, m) = m 
foR(e, m)<__.e i f0<e<l  and 0<m<l  (2) 
Notice that a relevance measure m = I for a condition that should be ANDed 
with other ones means that the condition is strictly necessary. Therefore the 
failure of such a condition (that is, its observed evidence is equal to 0) 
determines the failure of the complex condition in which the atomic one is a 
conjunct. On the other hand, m = 1 for an atomic condition to be ORed with 
others indicates that the satisfaction of the atomic condition itself is sufficient for 
the satisfaction of the complex condition (disjunction). 
There are many formulas atisfying (1) and (2). We propose here two possible 
alternative definitions of the functions fAND and foR: 
fAND(e, m) = m'e+ (1 - m) 
foR(e, m) = m*e (3) 
f~D(e ,  m) = e2(m z- m) + e(2m - m 2) + (1 - m) 
foR(e, m) = e2(m - m 2) + m2e (4) 
Formulas (3) are very simple and linear, while formulas (4) allow one to 
obtain more interesting corrections of the observed evidence values, with a 
greater computational effort. In Figures 1 and 2 the behavior o f f^~ and for  is 
reported for different values of the relevance measure m according to formulas 
(3). In any case, the choice between (3) and (4) [or other possible definitions 
compatible with (1) and (2) does not alter the global evaluation mechanism. 
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It is worth pointing out that the constraints listed in (1) and (2) seem to be very 
general and to hold in domains different from the one of expert systems (in 
particular, the use of prototypical descriptions). In fact, in a recent paper 
Sanchez [28] arrives at conclusions almost identical to the ones proposed here 
starting from a very different problem; the problem he focuses on concerns 
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Figure 2. 
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Approximate Reasoning and Prototypical Knowledge 167 
intelligent information retrieval. He advocates the introduction of an importance 
measure to weight the significance of a given document with respect o a given 
term (keyword) in a compound query. 
In particular, if we change the context (that is, if we put into correspondence 
the importance measures introduced by Sanchez with the relevance ones 
introduced in this paper, and significance of  a document with observed 
evidence of an elementary condition), we obtain the same formulas as those 
listed in (3). 
FUZZY MATCH FOR PROTOTYPICAL DESCRIPTIONS 
In this section we will discuss the problem of the fuzzy match between 
prototypical descriptions and sets of data. Particular attention will be paid to 
diagnostic problem solving, in which each diagnostic hypothesis is represented 
by a prototypical structure. Let us consider the slots of a frame representing a 
prototypical description. Each one of them describes a feature of the diagnostic 
hypothesis represented by the prototypical description in which it appears. In our 
scheme each of these slots has a fixed form; it is used to relate the possible 
linguistic values of  a finding Fi to the hypothesis itself. More particularly, each 
slot has the form 
(description, RM) 
where "description" is a set of  pairs: 
(linguistic_value, possibility_value) 
This means that a relevance measure RM is associated with each finding (i.e., to 
slots in both the NECESSARY description and the SUFFICIENT or SUPPLE- 
MENTARY one) 4. 
The interpretation of each slot is the following. The fact that the finding Fi 
takes the (linguistic) value V/) is compatible with the hypothesis H with 
possibility value #n(FiisVij) (following Zadeh's possibility theory [29]). Some 
comments are worthwhile. First, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
finding Fi can be defined by a linguistic variable that can assume linguistic 
values V U. In many cases F~ could be described in a more accurate way by means 
4 It is worth pointing out that for the sake of simplicity we assign arelevance measure just to each 
atomic ondition and the global evidence degree isevaluated by taking into account the relevance and 
the evidence degree of each atom. In principle itcould be possible to assign arelevance measure to
each combination f atomic onditions, but in most cases this could cause a huge increase in the 
complexity of the system (especially for the domain expert or the knowledge engineer who is in 
charge of providing reasonable estimates ofthe relevance measure). Inparticular, inthe prototypical 
description we decided to assign arelevance measure to each finding and not to each pair (finding, 
linguistic value) (see next paragraph for more comments). 
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of a fuzzy linguistic variable; the extension of our methods to this case does not 
require any major modification. 
In the problem of evaluating the fuzzy match of a prototypical description, 
what is really important is the evaluation of the evidence of the hypothesis 
represented by the prototypical description. This means that we are more 
interested in evaluating how the observation of a given finding contributes to 
establishing (or rejecting) ahypothesis rather then in evaluating the evidence of 
the finding per se. Therefore, the formulas introduced inthe previous ection are 
used to deal with evidence measures that represent conditional events. In 
particular, we interpret the observed evidence as the evidence in favor of the 
establishment ofa diagnostic hypothesis, given the event hat finding Fi assumes 
the value Ej. 
The evaluation of the degree of match of a prototypical description with the 
data of a specific ase is a complex problem that involves four major steps: 
1. The evaluation of the observed evidence for each elementary condition. 
According to the simplification discussed above (a finding is described by 
a linguistic variable rather than a fuzzy linguistic one), the evaluation of 
observed evidence reduces to the retrieval of the possibility value 
#//(F/is Vu) given that the actual value of F~ in the particular case under 
examination is Vii. 
2. The corrected evidence is then evaluated by using formulas (3) [or (4)] 
depending on the context in which the atomic condition appears, that is, 
using thefAND function for NECESSARY conditions (which are implicitly 
ANDed) and the fOR function for SUFFICIENT and SUPPLEMENTARY 
conditions (which in turn are implicitly ORed). 
3. The third step consists in evaluating the degree of match of each chunk of 
knowledge occurring in the prototypical description of each diagnostic 
hypothesis. This means that for both NECESSARY conditions and 
SUPPLEMENTARY (alternatively SUFFICIENT) conditions, the evi- 
dence of the hypothesis i evaluated, that is, e(HINECESSARY//) and 
e(HISUPPLEMENTARYI~) are computed. Since NECESSARY condi- 
tions are implicitly ANDed (SUPPLEMENTARY and SUFFICIENT are 
implicitly ORed), the evidence of the complex condition E (HINECES- 
SARYt/) [or e(HISUPPLEMENTARYH) reduces to evaluating the 
conjunction (disjunction) of the evidence degrees of the single atomic 
conditions constituting the NECESSARY// (or alternatively SUPPLE- 
MENTARY//) description. 
This opens the problem of selecting the semantics of the operator AND 
(OR) that implicitly connects the NECESSARY (SUFFICIENT or 
SUPPLEMENTARY) conditions. This problem has been lengthily de- 
bated and investigated (see Weber [30], for example); by taking into 
account our past experience in evidence combination i rule-based expert 
systems (Lesmo et al. [31, 32]), we adopt the formulas defined and 
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described by Lesmo et al. [16]. In particular we have 
e(AND (TIT2 "'" T~))=c~+~ * ( (3-c0 
where 
(5) 
n n 
~=I ' I  e(Tj) and /3 = rain e(Tj) 
j= l  j= l  
The resulting evidence degree is the product of the evidence degrees of the 
n elementary terms increased by a quantity that is a part of the difference 
between the minimum (B: upper bound) and the product (~: lower bound) 
proportional to the minimum. 
The semantic of the NOT operator is given, as usual in possibility theory 
(Zadeh [29]), as 
e(NOT T) = 1 - e(T) (6) 
As for the OR operator, the definition is given according to De Morgan's 
laws: 
e(OR (T~ T2 "-- T,,))=e(NOT (AND ((NOT T~) 
(NOT T2) " "  (NOT T~))) (7) 
The interpretation f logical connectives has some resemblance to that 
of possibility theory, even if the formulas defining the semantics of the 
logical connectives are not the usual ones (MAX for OR and MIN for 
AND). There are several reasons for not adopting the standard formulas: 
the major objection is the insensitivity of the result o the evidence degrees 
of all the different conditions apart from the one that has the largest value 
in an ORed expression (or the minimum in an AbiDed expressionS). 
It is worth noting that from a logical point of view the validity of the 
method for evaluating the fuzzy match of a prototypical description does 
not depend on the particular definition of the semantics of the fuzzy 
connectives. Obviously the numerical results obtained with other possible 
definitions may vary in a significant way, and therefore, from a pragmatic 
point of view, the acceptability ofthe method is influenced by the choice of 
a particular definition of the semantics of the connectives. 
4. The last step consists in combining the evidence of the different chunks of 
knowledge in a global evaluation of the evidence of the prototypical 
description. This step is described in the next section. 
s See Lesmo et aL [16] for further details. 
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In order to make clear the description of what we mean with a fuzzy 
prototypical description, a simplified example of  the prototypical description 
relative to the diagnostic hypothesis "electrical problems" in a car troubleshoot- 
ing domain is reported in the following: 
FRAME: electrical problems 
NECESSARY conditions 
ignition: I impossible, 1 ) (faulty,0.8) ( normal, 0.1 ) 
relevance: 1 
lights: (normal,0.1) (low_intensity,0.7) (not_burning,0.9) 
relevance: 0.5 
SUPPLEMENTARY conditions 
battery_water_level: (low, 1) (medium,O.6) (high,0.1) 
relevance: 0.7 
spark_.plugs_change: (less_than_ 10000_km,0.2) 
(between._ 10000_and_20000_km,0.5) 
(between_20000_and_30000_km,0.8) 
(more_than_30000_km, 1 ) 
relevance: 1 
For the sake of simplicity, just two NECESSARY and two SUPPLEMENTARY 
conditions are reported. The interpretation of the slots is the following: The 
condition that "ignit ion" if " faulty" is compatible with the diagnostic 
hypothesis "electrical problems" with a possibility value 0.8, whereas the 
condition that " l ights" are "normal"  is compatible with the hypothesis with a 
possibility value 0. I .  Moreover, the relevance measure of the finding 
"ignition" with respect o the hypothesis "electric problems" is 1, whereas the 
relevance measure of  " l ights" is 0.5. 
For actual prototypical descriptions of diagnostic hypotheses in a real domain, 
the reader is referred to Molino et al. [26]. 
Let us return to the problem of the semantics of  the representation formalism. 
Relevance measures are used to make the description more flexible and to 
provide a more sophisticated and precise way for computing the degree of match 
of a hypothesis and actual data 6. Consider, the example, NECESSARY 
conditions; the fact that a relevance measure is associated with each one of them 
6 The use of relevance measures is not restricted toprototypical descriptions but could prove very 
useful also for TRIGGERS and VALIDATION RULES. TRIGGERS are independent activation 
rules o that a strength of sufficiency is associated with each of them. TRIGGERS are just used as 
evocation rules and do not contribute othe global evaluation fa diagnostic hypothesis (the different 
relevances are used, however, to guide the search strategy inthe network of hypotheses: the ones 
activated by more relevant triggering rules are those that are more likely to be taken into account). 
Also in the case of VALIDATION RULES a relevance measure is associated with each rule for 
representing the strength of sufficiency of the rule within the group of VALIDATION RULES to 
which it belongs (see Torasso and Console [20] for more details). 
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means that they do not all have the same strength of necessity. Some findings 
(atomic onditions) are strictly necessary (RM close to 1), while others have a 
lower strength of necessity (RM dose of 0). 
It is worth noting that "relevance measures" allow us to express context- 
dependent information about which distortions and exceptions are more likely to 
be tolerated in the match of a specific situation and a prototypical description. In 
other words, findings with a low strength of necessity (with respect to a given 
description) arc those whose distortion (or absence) in a specific case does not 
have a decisive impact on the possibility of matching the specific ase itself with 
the prototypical description and consequently can be tolerated 7. 
In the case of SUPPLEMENTARY findings, the meaning of relevance 
measures is different and more complicated. Consider first the case of 
SUFFICIENT descriptions; in this case the relevance measure associated with a 
slot represents he strength of sufficiency of the finding contained in the slot 
itself. This interpretation can be adapted to the case of SUPPLEMENTARY 
descriptions. In fact, consider the group of SUPPLEMENTARY findings slots: 
Tbe conditions contained in these slots are ORed, so that the instantiation ofeven 
one of them can be sufficient o contribute to the better specification of a 
hypothesis. It follows the relevance measures can again be considered as 
sufficiency measures. What is changed from the case of SUFFICIENT 
descriptions i the scope of sufficiency; in the case of SUFFICIENT slots the 
scope is the frame, whereas in the case of SUPPLEMENTARY slots the scope is 
limited to the group of slots itself. 
It should be clear from this description that there is a great difference, from 
the semantic point of view, between NECESSARY conditions with a low 
strength of necessity and SUPPLEMENTARY ones. While the former describe 
properties whose cancellation can be tolerated (to different degrees), the latter 
can only give a better characterization (i addition to that given by NECES- 
SARY properties) of a situation (this difference will be clearer in the next section 
when the mechanisms for evidence combination are presented). 
In conclusion, let us summarize the way in which the match between 
prototypicai descriptions and data is performed. The process is as follows: 
• For NECESSARY conditions, the corrected evidence of each atomic 
condition (finding) is evaluated using the f~v  function. Such corrected 
values are then used to evaluate the global match of NECESSARY conditions 
using the AND connective formula (5). 
• Similarly, the global evidence of SUFFICIENT (and SUPPLEMEN- 
TARY) conditions can be determined using the foa and the OR evaluation 
formula. 
In a cefttin sense relevance measures are a flexible mechanism to deal with exceptions and 
distortions in prototypical descriptions (more flexible, but with less clear semantics, than the simple 
possibility of the canccUation of properties). 
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The major point to discuss now is how the evidence values obtained from 
each chunk of knowledge (i.e., NECESSARY, SUFFICIENT, and SUPPLE- 
MENTARY conditions) can be combined to give the final evidence value of 
the match of a prototypicai description (diagnostic hypothesis) against 
specific data. 
EVIDENCE COMBINATION 
In this section we describe how evidence values obtained from different 
chunks of knowledge can be combined to compute the global degree of match of 
a prototypical description and actual data. The major problem to be discussed is
how to combine the evidence values obtained from the match of NECESSARY 
and SUPPLEMENTARY conditions and actual data. 
Let us start by again considering the case of NECESSARY and SUFFICIENT 
descriptions and try to find a way to combine their evidence values. In this case 
the two values are to be considered in the same way: A frame can be instantiated 
if either NECESSARY conditions or one of the SUFFICIENT conditions is 
instantiated. No one of the values is in a privileged position. A simple way to 
combine them is to use a simple additive operation of the following from (which 
has been adopted by Shortliffe [33] in MYCIN and derives from probability 
theory): 
e~ +/e2 = el + (1 - e~) * e2 (8) 
The operation +f  is obviously commutative. 
It should be clear that this formula cannot be used, for example, to combine 
the evidence obtained from the match of NECESSARY and SUPPLEMEN- 
TARY conditions. In fact, suppose that the match between NECESSARY 
conditions and actual data has completely failed; then it would be sufficient o 
match one of the (relevant) SUPPLEMENTARY conditions with one datum in 
order to obtain the complete confirmation of the hypothesis. What we need is a 
different operation (unfair addition) in which one of the operands (e.g., the 
first) is in a privileged position. An acceptable result in such a case can be 
obtained by using the following addition formula (the first operand is the 
privileged one)S: 
e l+u e2=el+(1 -e l )  * el * e2 (9) 
If we assume that el is the evidence degree (H INECESSARY~) coming from 
NECESSARY conditions, and e2 the one from SUPPLEMENTARY conditions, 
e(/-/~ SUPPLEMENTARY/~), we have that the contribution of SUPPLEMEN- 
s This operation is obviously not commutative, but it is associative. This can be useful in combing 
evidence from more than two sources of knowledge. 
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TARY condition depends on the degree of match between NECESSARY 
conditions and actual data. 
Formulas (8) and (9) represent two extreme cases in the degree of fairness 
used in evidence combination. In particular, (8) represents he perfect fair case, 
since both contributions are treated equally, while (9) represents he unfair case, 
since the first contribution is the privileged one. A more general function, 
parametric with respect to degree of fairness of the combination, can be defined. 
AN EXAMPLE 
To conclude, we discuss a simple example of application of the evidence 
combination scheme we have designed. Let us consider the simple car 
troubleshooting example ("electrical_problems") reported in the previous 
section. Suppose now we are trying to instantiate he prototypical description of 
the diagnostic hypothesis "electrical_problems" on the following case 9. 
ignition faulty 
lights normal 
battery_water_level medium 
spark..plugs_change between_20000_and._30000_km 
To instantiate he frame, NECESSARY condition slots have to be instantiated 
first. Let us consider, for example, the "ignition" slot. From the prototypical 
description we know that the compatibility degree of the value "faulty" for the 
finding "ignition" is 0.8. The relevance of the finding (i.e., the strength of 
necessity of the characterization it gives) is 1, so that a corrected evidence value 
for the condition has to be computed to be used in the global evaluation of 
NECESSARY conditions. Since NECESSARY conditions are ANDed, the 
function f~ [formula (3)] is used to compute such corrected evidence, whose 
value is 0.8. Similar considerations apply to the slot "lights," whose corrected 
evidence is 0.55. Combining these two values with formula (5) (as noted, 
NECESSARY conditions are ANDed), we obtain 
e( electrical_problems NECESSARY etectrical_problems ) ---=0.5005 
It is worth noting that, although the compatibility of the linguistic value 
"normal" for the finding "lights" with respect o the diagnostic hypothesis 
"electrical problems" is very low, the influence of this value on the degree of 
match of NECESSARY conditions is limited by the low importance of the 
finding itself. 
Consider now the SUPPLEMENTARY conditions, in particular the "bat- 
9 It is worth noting that, according tothe simplification hypothesis we have made, we assume that 
linguistic terms like "faulty" or "normal" can be defined ina crisp way. 
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tery_water_level" condition. In this case the compatibility degree of the value 
"medium" for the finding "battery_water_level" is 0.6, and a corrected 
evidence value for the condition has to be computed, taking into account its 
relevance. Using the function fOR [formula (3)] (remember that SUPPLEMEN- 
TARY conditions are ORed), we obtain the final value 0.42 for the corrected 
evidence of such a condition. Applying similar considerations to the slot 
"spark_plugs_change," we obtain the evidence value 0.8. These two values are 
then combined using formula (7) (they are ORed) to get the final evidence degree 
e(electrical_problemslSUPPLEMENTARYelearicat_aroble~ ) = 0.8672 for the 
SUPPLEMENTARY conditions of the frame. The two evidence values 
obtained from the match of NECESSARY and SUPPLEMENTARY conditions 
with actual data then have to be combined in the final value representing the 
degree of match of the prototypical description and actual data. As noticed 
above, an unfair additive operator [formula (9)] is used to combined these 
values. In the specific case we are discussing, the total evidence of the match of 
the prototypical description of the frame and actual data is 0.7177. Note that the 
influence of supplementary findings on the global degree of match is limited. 
To have a more precise idea of the effect of relevance measures in the 
evaluation of the evidence of the match of the prototypical description and actual 
data, let us consider again the "electrical_problems" frame and try to evaluate 
its degree of match with the data reported above, ignoring the relevance 
measures. This means that we will not consider corrected evidence degrees, 
and we will base the evaluation of the NECESSARY and SUPPLEMENTARY 
conditions on observed ones. The results that can be obtained in such a case are 
the following. Let us consider first NECESSARY conditions; the evidence 
values for the two conditions are 
e(ignition is faulty) = IZelecmca_problems( ignition is faulty) = 0.8 
e( lights is normal)= lZelectri~aCprobte.~( lights is normal)= 0.1 
so that e(electrical_problems[ NECESSARYelectricaCrrobtem~) = 0.082. Notice 
that in this case the fact that one of the conditions has a low evidence has a great 
impact on the evidence of NECESSARY conditions. 
As far as SUPPLEMENTARY conditions are concerned, we have that the 
evidence values for the two slots are 
e( battery_ water_level is medium ) = 0.6 
e( spark_plugs_change is between_2OOOO_and_3OOOO_km ) = 0.8 
so that the total evidence e(electrical_problems[ SUPPLEMEN- 
TARYelectrlcal_oroblems ) = 0.896. Using formula (9) we can now compute the 
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global evidence of the degree of match of the frame and actual data, whose final 
value is 0.1495. 
It should be clear from the comparison of this value with the one obtained 
when relevance measures are taken into account hat the adoption of relevance 
measures has a great impact on the evaluation of a frame. In particular, in the 
example we have that such information allows us to limit the influence of the 
absence of not very important data in the global evaluation of the degree of 
match of the frame. This proves to be very useful, in particular in diagnostic (or, 
more particularly medical diagnostic) applications, in which the different 
degrees of relevance of data (findings or laboratory tests) play a very important 
role. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have defined a precise formalism for prototypical knowledge representa- 
tion and have introduced a general evaluation mechanism to deal with such a 
form of knowledge. We have recognized that to make prototypical descriptions 
more flexible the distinction between NECESSARY, SUFFICIENT, and 
SUPPLEMENTARY conditions is almost mandatory. Moreover, we have 
introduced an evaluation mechanism based on fuzzy logic supplemented with 
relevance measures in order to avoid the distinction between strictly necessary 
conditions and strictly sufficient ones. Such relevance measures provide a 
flexible mechanism to describe which exceptions and distortions are more likely 
to be tolerated in a prototypical description. 
Formulas (8) and (9) can be used to evaluate the overall evidence degree of a 
diagnostic hypothesis when the frames represent not only prototypical knowl- 
edge hut also control knowledge (for example, TRIGGERS and VALIDATION 
RULES). For an in-depth discussion see Torasso and Console [20]. 
In conclusion, while relevance measures allow us to take into account in a 
systematic way the differences in the importance of data in computing the 
evidence of each group of slots, the criteria defined in the section on evidence 
combination allow us to weigh properly these different components in the final 
evaluation of the degree of match of a frame against the actual data of a 
particular case. 
The evidence combination mechanism described here has been used in the 
heuristic level of CHECK, a two-level diagnostic architecture combining 
heuristic and causal reasoning (see Console and Torasso [24, 29] and Molino et 
al. [26] for more details). In such a system initial values (estimates) for 
relevance measures (and for the compatibility degrees of the different findings) 
are provided by the domain expert. However, we are currently studying how to 
automatically refine such initial parameters as long as the "experience" of the 
system in solving problems increases (see Torasso [34] for a discussion). 
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